1 INTRODUCTION
Very often, writing about the Middle East is an unproductive exercise: every war or crisis in this part of the world always ends up in a new form of stalemate. If one is to go by from what we know of the outlines of the agreement that President Trump and Iran’s newly minted Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, are discussing then we are certainly heading towards another stalemate, ie, the two combatants have tacitly agreed between themselves that they need time to recover from the present bout, before they are ready for yet another fight: It is, as if in a boundless desert, a dune has been blown away from its place and all the sand has now accumulated further down the track to form another dune making the road to the oasis as hazardous as before, writes Vidya S. Sharma Ph.D.
The Middle East is a region characterised by being in eternal transition, ambiguity, or unresolved (or unresolvable) problems and a playground for mischief-making by the global and regional superpowers of the day.
This is why I avoid writing about the Middle East. However, many of my friends/clients and readers of the EUReporter have asked me to explain why Russia and China did not come to Iran’s aid during the present war. This notion that they should have come to Iran’s aid or that it showed their weakness was fuelled by a few articles/news stories in mainstream media and journals/magazines dealing with foreign affairs.
To understand China and Russia’s response, we need to appreciate how differently the US, China and Russia see the world.
2 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US AND CHINESE SECURITY MODELS
The US and China differ markedly in their world views. Further, Russia’s worldview differs substantially from China’s and that of the US.
The US security model emanated from its experience and role in World War II. It relies on a network of formal military alliances/treaties (eg, NATO, its bilateral and multilateral treaties with various Gulf countries, Israel, Japan, South Korea, ANZAC (with two countries: Australia and New Zealand), AUKUS, etc.).
The US claims to encourage “rules-based” international order, but it has a long history of flouting those rules to pursue its foreign policy aims. For instance, neither NATO nor President Clinton sought approval from the UN Security Council (and in the case of the Clinton Administration, an approval from Congress was also missing) before launching the 1999 military campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (in practice, Serbia and Montenegro). For a more detailed discussion, please see John Yoo’s paper entitled “UN Wars and US war powers” in the Chicago Journal of International Law (2000).
Similarly, President Bush Jr. invaded Iraq (Iraq War Mark II) without the imprimatur of the UN. The then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan explicitly stated that the invasion was not “in conformity with the UN Charter” and was, from the UN’s perspective, “illegal under international law”. The resolution put forward by the Bush Jr. administration was not only vetoed by Russia but also by France.
President Obama had the UN backing to launch military strikes on Libya (in 2011),but never sought the approval of the US Congress. However, in the case of Syria, on both occasions (first in 2013, and then for military strikes against ISIS in 2014), Obama never had either the UN backing or the approval or the US Congress. Neither Libya nor Syria posed any threats to the US.
Similarly, President Trump invaded Venezuela and attacked Iran without seeking either the approval of Congress or the UN. His blockade of Cuba, legally an act of war, has neither the permission of the UN nor that of the US Congress. None of these three countries posed any threat to the US.
All three recent foreign policy adventures of President Trump are illegal when judged either through the lens of international law (rules-based system as proposed by the US and European countries, especially NATO) or according to the US Constitution.
In fact, all presidents since Nixon (except Jimmy Carter, who never started a war) have regularly neglected to seek Congress’s permission. Some have not even bothered to notify Congress.
Further, the deliberate weaponisation of the international financial system and of the US dollar (again, this practice goes as far back as the Clinton Administration at least) are also examples of flouting “rules-based” order to advance US foreign policy objectives (some would say to bully other countries to follow the US diktat).
The US has also sometimes weaponised its universal technological systems. For example, during the Kargil War (in 1999), India was fighting with Pakistan in the vertical terrain of the Himalayas. Indian artillery shells and air forces were blind, either missing Pakistani bunkers completely or hitting their own advancing troops. India requested the US to grant India precise encryption keys of the GPS to reduce the margin of error from 100 meters to around 5 metres. The Clinton Administration refused this request as a punishment to India because a year earlier in 1998, India conducted a series of five nuclear bomb test explosions at Pokhran.
3 CHINESE WAY OF GAINING INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE
On the other hand, the Chinese model generally gives preference to state sovereignty, ie, not interfering in other countries’ internal affairs on the pretext of preventing human rights abuses. The most glaring example of this policy is China’s continued support of the junta of Myanmar and its close ties with Zimbabwe, which began long before Robert Mugabe imprisoned and/or liquidated all of his opponents irrespective of their skin colour.
China prefers internal stability (read no political opposition) and economy-led security. Human rights, transparency in governance, fair elections, the principle that no one is above the law, etc., are considered internal matters and therefore do not play any role in China’s calculations.
To help a country gain internal stability, China offers its police and security personnel to train the target country’s police force. It also supplies the target country with all the necessary software, apps, and hardware required for surveillance purposes.
China considers the U.S. a “hegemonic” superpower that acts unilaterally. China rejects formal military alliances and promotes a concept of a shared future through its Global Security Initiative (GSI). The GSI is one of the three pillars proposed by Xi for a reformed world order.
The GSI was first proposed by President Xi Jinping in April 2022. The GSI postulates that internal security and stability are the necessary preconditions to economic development.
China considers political stability in a target country of utmost importance so that Chinese projects (eg, ports, undersea fibre optic cables for communication, new parliament houses (at least built so far in 15 countries),etc.) will not encounter any political resistance.
These projects in a target country simultaneously serve three purposes: (a) to enhance China’s international presence and profile, (b) cement the position of its export-led economic model, and (c) bind that country’s economic future to China; most times, China knows that the country in question would be unable to pay the loans. This is why Western countries call it China’s Debt trap diplomacy.
The GSI “actively promotes the expansion of Chinese international policing activity as a way for China to contribute to the supply of global-security goods”. For example, China has been actively pursuing this policy with the South Pacific Island countries to restrict the operational flexibility and to reduce the influence of Australia and squeeze out the US.
It is in this context that Chinese economic initiatives like financing and building the Digital Silk Road (data centres, laying underground fibre optic cables in the South Pacific Sea, satellite navigation systems (such as BeiDou) associated with megaprojects in the Gulf countries, etc.), its massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), etc. are best explained and understood.
4 CHINA’S EXPANDING MILITARY (NAVAL) FOOTPRINT
Officially, China has only one foreign naval base, ie, in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. This base has the facilities to house a large number of troops, for helicopters to land and for berthing aircraft carriers.
However, China has been rapidly but quietly expanding its overseas footprint.
In Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, Chinese warships maintain a near-continuous presence.
China’s “strings of pearls” strategy which comprises developing commerce and military ties and also constructing port facilities in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, etc., that can be converted into naval bases without much difficulty. These “pearls” help China to project its power in the Indian Ocean, encircle India and cramp the US’s options. It is also building ports in African countries that can be quickly transformed into naval bases.
Just like the US, there is a wide chasm between what China preaches and its actions. It ignores legal findings when they go against its interests.
China shares land or maritime borders with 21 countries and is actively involved in border and territorial disputes with at least 17 of its neighbours. It has not been averse to using force to settle these disputes.
To give another example, in 2016, an arbitral tribunal under the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague ruled overwhelmingly in favour of the Philippines, invalidating China’s expansive “nine-dash line” historic claims over the South China Sea. The PCA confirmed Manila’s sovereign rights.
This ruling was legally binding under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). But the Chinese government categorically rejected the decision, labelling it “null and void”.
In the South China Sea, China has constructed 27 man-made islands (7 man-made islands built from the scratch in the Spratly Islands midway between Vietnam and the Philippines) and 20 military outposts further north amongst the Paracel Islands.
These are highly fortified structures and China considers them as domestic territory under its “Nine-Dash Line” claim. Under international law these bases are unlawful.
It has militarised the Taiwan Strait to such an extent that it has become a no-go area even to the US Navy.
AidData Research Lab has identified many more countries where China is constructing port facilities that could be turned into naval bases when desired.
China is trying to crimp the USA’s ability to impose wide-ranging sanctions by banning countries/individuals/organisations from using SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) inter-banking network. The latter was created by institutions from the U.S., the European Union and G-7 countries. To counter SWIFT China has developed the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). China encourages companies trading with China and other countries to use CIPS. Through CIPS, China is trying to make Renminbi (RMB) a global currency.
In summary, China is becoming increasingly a more formidable adversary/competitor and remains a revanchist state. Unfortunately, the US is also behaving like a revanchist state if one is go by Trump’s recent pronouncement about Greenland and Canada.
5 RUSSIAN MODEL
Both Russia and China promote the notion that the US pursues a unipolar world where the US is the only superpower and all other countries must follow a foreign policy expected of vassal states.
China believes in a bipolar world (ie, the US and China dividing the world between them). On the other hand, Russia believes in a multipolar or polycentric world model.
It is this common belief that the US is a hegemon that encourages China and Russia to cooperate and try to subvert US or Western dominance exercised through such institutions as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, SWIFT inter-bank international clearing system, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (controlled by the World Bank), The International Court of Justice (in The Hague), The International Criminal Court (in The Hague), and a network of naval and territorial bases spread around the world, etc. Further, until very recently, almost all international contracts were written in US dollars.
But there are notable differences between China’s and Russia’s world views.
China’s economy is built around being a manufacturing factory for the world. Consequently, China wants to work within the system, ensuring it remains stable yet it wishes to reform the Western dominated system to make it more pliant to China’s vision.
On the other hand, Russia aims to disrupt and evert US or Western dominance by taking advantage of or creating geopolitical volatility. Russia’s model relies on hard power (just like the US), asymmetric disruption (proxy wars either by supporting target countries directly as was the case in Syria or through mercenary armies as in most African countries), and playing the role of a strategic spoiler (the same roles as the two superpowers – the US and the Soviet Union – played against one another during the Cold War).
Russia has a fortress or self-contained economy. So Russia promotes a model where countries will be economically self-reliant. It offers economic development, but its primary emphasis is on arms sales, providing mercenary armies to fight insurrection/political opposition (e.g., Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic, etc.), and how to evade Western sanctions.
6 WHY CHINA DID NOT OPENLY COME TO THE AID OF IRAN
Iran has strong economic and defence ties both with China and Russia. For example, between 80 – 90 percent of its oil exports go to China and in return Iran buys from the latter cars, tractors, trucks, and automotive parts, electrical and electronic equipment, and technological know-how and components that have use both in the civilian and defence sectors. Therefore, one would assume China will openly support Iran in its war with the US and Israel.
However, China has become rich and militarily powerful by taking advantage of loopholes in the international trading system, by pilfering technologies from Western countries, and pretending to be a market economy (a blessing bestowed on China by President Clinton by supporting China’s membership of the World Trade Organisation) while heavily subsidising its export-oriented industries.
China has enmeshed its economy in the economies of the countries it exports to. Consequently, China does not want to disturb the present system. It merely wants to modify it in a way that will suit China to the extent that it can then dominate the present system or co-dominate it with the US. It does not want to disturb the apple cart. It merely wants to rearrange the apples so that its apples are on top.
While China may have close defence ties with Iran, but it also trades with all the Gulf States as well as Israel. Let me mention a few of China’s economic interests in the Gulf States.
Chinese telecommunication and logistics companies are supplying next-generation 5G/6G infrastructure, cloud computing, and AI systems for mega-projects in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. China uses Dubai’s Jebel Ali port as the primary re-export hub to distribute its goods across the Middle East and Africa. All six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are official participants in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS+.
It is not a one-way street. China relies heavily on Gulf countries to meet for its energy needs. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman are the top suppliers of crude oil to China. Similarly, Qatar has signed many long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) contracts with Chinese companies.
For China, it was more important to protect and advance its economic interests with wealthy Gulf States than to openly support Iran. Publicly, its support to Iran was confined to not criticizing Iran and blaming the US for launching an illegal and unprovoked war. It also criticized the US for its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
To ease out the US from the Middle East, China has been working hard to persuade the Gulf states and Egypt to form a security pact.
7 RUSSIA & CHINA’S AID TO IRAN
In fact, both Russia and China helped Iran extensively but quietly during the war and continue to help Iran to overcome hardships caused by the US’s naval blockade of the Persian Gulf.
However, it must be remembered that Iran does not have a security treaty with either of them. In other words, they did not have a legal obligation to aid Iran.
In the first few days of fighting, the joint US-Israeli bombing campaign heavily degraded Iran’s independent reconnaissance capabilities and claimed they had nearly achieved total control over Iranian airspace.
Yet according to the Congressional Research Service, at least 42 U.S. military aircraft were lost or damaged during the Iran War. Further, according to documented military tallies, Israel lost 7 aircraft.
The Washington Post asked a retired Marine Corps colonel, Mark Cancian (now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies), to examine the satellite data for the newspaper. Cancian found that Iran has hit far more U.S. military assets than reported.
CNN also found that at least 16 American military sites have been damaged in Iranian strikes, making up the majority of US positions in the Middle East. Some of the US bases have been very severely damaged.
Iran was able to inflict so much damage because Russia was actively providing Iran with real-time targeting intelligence, including the exact locations and movements of United States warships, aircraft, and troops, since the outbreak of the US-Israeli conflict with Iran on 28 February 2026. Besides providing tracking data, Russia also actively trained Iranian operators in advanced drone tactics based on Russia’s experiences in Ukraine.
Ukrainian President Zelenskyy told Politico that Russia was mapping US assets to help Iran. He also said that Russia provided satellite images to Tehran, including photos of the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, which Iran later attacked.
Those familiar with the Ukraine-Russia War already know that Russia buys drones from Iran. In return, Russia sells to Iran wheat, other agricultural products and advanced military hardware and dual-use technology items.
During the current ceasefire, through the land locked Caspian Sea, Russia is shipping not only agricultural products but also military and commercial goods to bolster Tehran’s ability to withstand the U.S. assault and prepare Iran for resumption of hostilities (which is a possibility if the negotiations between Iran and the US do no bear any fruit due to both combatants adhering to their maximalist demands).
Similarly, Pakistan, known for its very close defence and economic ties with China, has opened six land routes to transport third-country goods (read China) into Iran. Iran has a direct trade route to China through China’s Bricks and Road Initiative (BRI).
Vidya S. Sharma advises clients on country risks and technology-based joint ventures. He has contributed numerous articles for such prestigious newspapers as: The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age (Melbourne), The Australian Financial Review, The Economic Times (India),The Business Standard (India), EU Reporter (Brussels), East Asia Forum (Canberra), The Business Line (Chennai, India), The Hindustan Times (India), The Financial Express (India), The Daily Caller (US. He can be contacted at: sharmavidyasagar@gmail.com.
