Ukraine And Gulf Conflicts Have Become Increasingly Intertwined, Says Russia-Iran Analyst Nicole Grajewski

WASHINGTON — Russia’s partnership with Iran has become one of the most influential strategic partnerships in today’s geopolitical landscape.

While Moscow and Tehran have stopped short of a formal military alliance, their cooperation in drones, intelligence, sanctions evasion and internal security has deepened since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In an interview with RFE/RL, Nicole Grajewski, an expert on Russian-Iranian relations at Sciences Po and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explains how the conflicts in Ukraine and the Persian Gulf have become increasingly intertwined — and how far Russia is willing to go to support Iran.

RFE/RL: As regional strikes and maritime escalation intensify across the Persian Gulf, how is the deepening partnership between Moscow and Tehran reshaping both the war in Ukraine and the broader security crisis in the Middle East?

Nicole Grajewski: What’s fairly apparent with the current war and the war in Ukraine is how intertwined the Russia-Iran relationship is and how it’s transformed.

For example, Iran provided Russia with the Shahed drones that were used quite extensively in Ukraine. In return, Russia has been providing crucial support to Iran when it comes to satellite imagery, potentially targeting support, as well as training, operational assistance, and data sharing.

So there’s a kind of synergy that actually derived from the war in Ukraine, and you see it translating into this current war. Additionally, many of the same threats that Ukrainians face on a daily basis are what US Gulf allies are currently facing. During the war, Ukraine reached out to Gulf partners when it came to counter-UAV and counter-drone warfare.

There are a lot of connections between these two wars, and I think it’s a mistake not to analyze them together because they’re inextricably tied through the two actors involved, but also through the same technologies and the sharing of resources.

RFE/RL: Iran’s drone and missile technologies proved critical for Russia’s campaign in Ukraine. But as Tehran faces mounting threats in the Gulf, is Moscow returning the favor, or is it holding back its own military resources for the Ukrainian front?

Grajewski: It’s unclear what Russian technology has been transferred and what has appeared in Iranian UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles). It is very clear, though, that Iran’s strategy, tactics, and even operational methods have improved, and they share some similarities with Russia’s use of these systems in Ukraine.

But we don’t see Russia transferring a single major weapon system to Iran. The last reported transfer was the Financial Times report about the Verba MANPADS deal (a reported December 2025 agreement for Iran to acquire Russian-made shoulder-fired air-defense missiles). Since the war, there hasn’t been a direct transfer of a complete weapons system.

However, because Iran has — or at least before the war had — a fairly robust defense industry and military-industrial complex, Russia can provide components and subcomponents that allow Iran to iteratively improve its UAVs.

From what we know so far in this campaign, there are some indications that this is happening, although there hasn’t been a smoking gun identifying exactly which components have been transferred.

RFE/RL: Tehran has long looked to Moscow for advanced air defenses and electronic warfare systems. Given the demands of the war in Ukraine, does Russia still have either the capacity or the political willingness to strengthen Iran’s defenses?

Grajewski: It depends on what we’re talking about because Russia excels in producing certain systems more than others. For example, much of Iran’s defensive electronic warfare capability comes from Russia, and we don’t know whether the Russians have transferred offensive electronic warfare capabilities that simply haven’t been reported yet.

It’s also unclear whether Russia has helped Iran rebuild radar systems that were destroyed, but that’s another area where it could provide assistance.

The biggest issue — and this is where it really comes back to the war in Ukraine — is air defense systems. Russia is in a difficult position when it comes to providing those because it needs them itself, and Iran also lacks the financial resources to purchase them.

But there are other ways Russia can provide incremental improvements to Iranian capabilities. That could include light arms or drone subcomponents. So it’s not really accurate to say that Russia is so tied down in Ukraine that it can’t provide Iran with anything. If anything, it’s still able to support Iran in the areas where Tehran needs it most.

RFE/RL: You’ve argued that Russia risks looking like a fair-weather partner after developments in Syria and Venezuela. If Iran were to face an existential military crisis, would Moscow step in — or leave Tehran to fend for itself?

Grajewski: That’s a really interesting question, and we haven’t really seen that with this current war, even though at certain points it appeared that the Islamic Republic of Iran was facing an existential crisis.

Iran is very different from Syria for Russia. Iran is largely independent. It has its own capabilities and can challenge American power directly in ways Syria or Venezuela couldn’t. It also has a highly bureaucratized and relatively advanced military organization that is spread across the country. So we haven’t seen Russia being necessary in that sense.

However, if the situation reached the brink of civil war or widespread chaos, with the regime collapsing and being replaced by something resembling the vacuum we saw in Syria, then I do think Russia would become involved. That could mean special operations forces or potentially private military contractors.

I don’t think we would see a large Russian military deployment or an air campaign similar to Syria. It would be much more measured, focused on providing operational support to whatever remnants of the Iranian government Russia chose to back.

RFE/RL: Gulf instability drives up global oil prices, benefiting Russia’s war economy. At the same time, discounted Russian crude competes directly with Iranian exports in Asia. Is energy competition preventing Moscow and Tehran from becoming true economic allies?

Grajewski: The problem is that the Russia-Iran economic relationship has never really been robust. Trade volume between the two countries is actually quite modest, although it has increased significantly since the war in Ukraine.

Part of the reason is that both countries import similar products and export similar products. At the end of the day, they’re both energy exporters, so they don’t really have complementary trade systems.

Competition in energy markets has been a sore point for Iran since the war in Ukraine. Russia entered black markets where Iran traditionally sold its oil. It also moved into the so-called teapot refinery market in China, which had long been an important outlet for Iranian exports. Russia even absorbed some of the tanker capacity that Iran had relied on by expanding its own shadow fleet.

So that has certainly created tensions, and I think the economic dimension has always been the weakest part of the relationship.

At the same time, sanctions evasion has created entirely new forms of cooperation. That’s one of the contradictions in the relationship.

RFE/RL: China buys large volumes of both Russian and Iranian oil. How do disruptions in Persian Gulf energy supplies affect Beijing’s leverage over Moscow and Tehran? Does China act as a moderating force?

Grajewski: China’s relationship with both countries is crucial to their survival. It has provided important components and financial support that have helped both Russia and Iran weather their respective conflicts.

But China doesn’t benefit from instability in the Strait of Hormuz in the same way Russia might. Beijing has extensive trade relations with the Gulf monarchies and depends heavily on energy supplies from the region.

So in some areas, China has been more restrained and has tried to find ways to reduce tensions. Russia hasn’t really been able to play that role, partly because it no longer enjoys the same goodwill in the Gulf that it had before the war.

I think it’s fairly clear in the Gulf that Russia’s loyalties are now seen as being much closer to Iran, although Gulf states still want to maintain practical relations with Moscow. It’s a complicated picture.

China, meanwhile, creates competition because both Russia and Iran want to maintain favorable access to the Chinese market. But overall, Beijing has taken a much more moderate position regarding escalation.

RFE/RL: In your recent research, you’ve described how Moscow helps sustain Iran’s political system during periods of domestic unrest. How important is Russian expertise in information control and internal repression to the survival of the Islamic republic?

Grajewski: The Iranians have learned a great deal from Russia, going back to the color revolutions and Russian domestic protests, particularly when it comes to methods of authoritarian control. They’ve also learned quite a bit from China regarding Internet shutdowns.

During the most recent wave of protests, Iran went much further than it had before. It carried out far more selective Internet shutdowns while also maintaining critical domestic services — something it had struggled to do previously.

That bears some of the hallmarks of Russian or Chinese assistance. Russia and Iran also have agreements between their internal security services dating back to around 2014, and they’ve expanded those arrangements over time. The Information Security Agreement (a 2021 Russia-Iran cybersecurity cooperation pact ) includes provisions for support and data sharing.

Russia has therefore been very important, although I wouldn’t discount Iran’s own repressive apparatus. It is capable on its own, but it has clearly benefited from support provided by other like-minded authoritarian states.

RFE/RL: Reports suggest Russia has shared satellite-based targeting information with Iran. How far is the Kremlin willing to go in strengthening Iranian military capabilities without provoking direct confrontation with the West?

Grajewski: Most of Russia’s support for Iran has been carried out under a veneer of plausible deniability. Russia has denied allegations about satellite support or simply joked that it’s no different from the assistance the United States provides to Ukraine.

Moscow hasn’t been willing to openly declare that it’s involved in this conflict, which makes sense given its relationships with the Gulf states.

At the same time, Russia’s rhetoric toward Gulf monarchies has become noticeably more critical, especially regarding their hosting of US military bases, even compared with the 12-Day War .

I wouldn’t describe Russia as passive. Rather, it’s providing support in ways that preserve deniability. Satellite imagery and data sharing are not the same as direct arms transfers. You don’t see Russian troops on the ground.

Instead, Russia is making incremental upgrades to Iranian capabilities — particularly in areas like space-based intelligence, where Iran has significant gaps. But Moscow is not preparing to join the conflict as part of a military coalition.

RFE/RL: Finally, do Western sanctions and efforts to isolate Russia and Iran actually contain the two countries — or are they reinforcing a long-term strategic partnership?

Grajewski: One thing that’s very clear is that sanctions are difficult to remove once they’re implemented, especially in the United States. There have been sanctions waivers for Russia — for example, certain oil waivers related to the war with Iran — but overall, sanctions remain in place.

Iran has been under much more extensive sanctions than Russia, but both countries now find themselves in similar positions internationally.

To some extent, yes, they’ve become isolated. But they’ve also found new ways to work together. Their cooperation on sanctions evasion has expanded considerably, and that’s become an important part of the relationship.

It’s difficult to say whether sanctions are directly pushing them together, but they have unquestionably created new areas of cooperation. Russia, in particular, has learned a great deal from Iran’s long experience in navigating and circumventing sanctions.