The parliamentary elections held in Armenia on 7 June did not merely determine the country’s political future. They also became another test demonstrating how the West approaches issues of democracy, electoral transparency, and political legitimacy. Once again, the West failed this test. The issue is not whether the elections in Armenia were democratic or not; that is a problem for Armenian voters, politicians, and those who govern them. The issue is double standards. While European leaders lined up to congratulate Nikol Pashinyan (pictured) on his victory, treating the Armenian electoral spectacle within a geopolitical context, they seek to punish other states that show them “disobedience” on geopolitical matters under the banner of “defending democracy”, writes Fuad Abdullayev.
According to the announced election results, Nikol Pashinyan’s “Civil Contract” party won 64 seats. This number allows Pashinyan to form a government on his own. But by what means were these mandates obtained?
According to observers and sources in Armenia, tensions within the government increased as the elections approached. Calculations made by the election strategists of the “Civil Contract” party (both Armenian and Western) indicated that the May 28 military parade, which was expected to add 13–15 percentage points to Pashinyan’s rating, as well as the mass visits of Macron and other European leaders to Yerevan in May, failed to produce the desired effect.
The primary goal of Pashinyan and his team was to secure at least two-thirds of the seats in parliament. Such a result would have enabled him to obtain a constitutional majority. However, as the elections drew nearer, confidential sociological surveys reflecting the real situation, along with analyses received from local party offices, showed that achieving this goal would be difficult. Faced with these pessimistic forecasts, Pashinyan revised his ambitions and instructed his team to secure at least three-fifths of the mandates. Possession of three-fifths of the seats would allow him to submit constitutional amendments to a referendum and make changes to constitutional laws.
The government’s effort to portray the opposition as associated with Russia and to make this the central theme of the campaign also failed to produce the desired effect. It proved impossible to attract a significant portion of undecided voters to the ruling party. It should be noted that, according to figures from January 2026, undecided voters in Armenia accounted for 44–47 percent of the electorate. This is a very large number and means that nearly half of voters did not support any political force in the country, including the ruling party.
As a result, the election campaign became increasingly harsh. For Pashinyan and the European leaders supporting him, the end justified the means. Whether those means were democratic was of little importance. The dissemination of audio recordings of unknown origin by Armenian law-enforcement agencies, intensified smear campaigns against political opponents, the use of legal pressure against the opposition’s relatively few skilled political technologists, and the arrests and blackmail of opposition leaders and their family members became characteristic features of the electoral environment. It should be noted that the purpose of targeted arrests of individuals involved in opposition election technologies was to deprive the opposition of specialists capable of both managing the campaign and exposing electoral violations by the authorities. The detention and persecution of experts who could work with electoral mechanisms and voters weakened the opposition’s ability to resist election manipulation.
Reports submitted to Pashinyan by Armenia’s Central Election Commission stated that voter turnout was expected to be between 1.3 and 1.5 million people. Under such circumstances, Pashinyan instructed his team to secure at least 690,000–700,000 votes in order to form a government alone and obtain three-fifths of the parliamentary mandates. By the second half of May, it became clear that reaching this figure would be impossible. Consequently, the authorities intensified their work with public-sector employees, particularly those in education, healthcare, and the military, encouraging them to vote for the “Civil Contract” party. At the same time, party officials intensified their activities among voters in Kapan, Gyumri, Meghri, and several border settlements of Tavush, where the ruling party’s positions were weak.
Another issue concerned Armenians living abroad. Under Armenian law, citizens can vote only within Armenia. Pashinyan’s primary concern was Armenians arriving from Russia, whom the ruling party viewed as part of the opposition electorate. Before the elections, intensive reports circulated suggesting that Armenians arriving from Russia might be drafted into military exercises. These reports influenced the electoral process and further heightened the atmosphere of fear. As a result, some Armenian citizens refrained from participating in the vote, effectively losing their right to choose due to intimidation.
In order to secure Pashinyan’s victory, European countries reportedly began providing unprecedented support to the Armenian authorities from November 2025 onward. This support was not limited to political rhetoric but was also reflected in practical measures. Groups consisting of European election technologists and intelligence personnel allegedly arrived in Armenia. These groups reportedly advised Pashinyan on how to counter “Russian hybrid influence” and instructed pro-government media outlets and the ruling team regarding pressure, influence, and propaganda measures to be used against political opponents during the campaign. In addition, a special group assessed the public mood in Armenia and transmitted narratives to both local and European media resources with the aim of directing the electorate in favor of the ruling party. Considerable support for coordinating activities in Armenia’s cyber domain related to the elections was allegedly provided by British intelligence services.
At the same time, representatives of major Western media organizations such as Reuters, BBC, Sky News, The Guardian, El País, and others arrived in Armenia before the elections with prepared materials intended to demonstrate that the Armenian parliamentary elections were being conducted under democratic conditions.
Despite all these preparations, on election day information reportedly reached the headquarters of the “Civil Contract” party indicating that the voting process was not developing in Pashinyan’s favor. Since reassuring information about the progress of voting was not being received, Pashinyan began instructing members of his team in the evening of June 7 to make the necessary preparations to secure the required number of votes. The choice of evening hours was not accidental. Pashinyan’s team allegedly avoided manipulation during active voting hours and instead selected the vote-counting period in the evening as the appropriate time. Furthermore, shortly before the close of voting, the authorities allegedly took an unprecedented step by transporting military personnel from barracks, in military uniform and in groups, to polling stations to vote for Pashinyan’s party.
The vote count itself was also allegedly problematic. According to preliminary results announced by Armenia’s Central Election Commission, the “Civil Contract” party won more than 49 percent of the vote and secured 61 out of 105 parliamentary seats in what was presented as a “democratic” election before Western observers and media representatives. This result allowed the party to form a government but was insufficient to initiate constitutional amendments through a referendum. For that, Pashinyan needed at least 63 seats in the 105-member parliament.
To obtain those additional seats, while vote counting was still underway, Pashinyan’s election strategists allegedly devised a new approach: to remove Gagik Tsarukyan’s “Prosperous Armenia” party from parliament by depriving it of a small number of votes. “Prosperous Armenia” had won 4 percent of the vote and 5 parliamentary mandates. Four percent is the minimum threshold required for parties to enter parliament in Armenia. Under these circumstances, depriving Tsarukyan of approximately 60 votes, or 0.004 percent of support, would have been sufficient. The political blocs of Kocharyan and Karapetyan allegedly turned a blind eye to this maneuver around Tsarukyan’s votes, because if his party failed to enter parliament, they themselves would gain additional mandates.
It is known that as early as 2021, Pashinyan instructed the legal experts of the ruling team to prepare a draft of constitutional amendments. Therefore, one of the main goals of the ruling party in these elections was not only to form a government independently but also to secure the possibility of implementing constitutional changes. According to Pashinyan’s plans, adoption of the constitutional amendments would strengthen his power. Having already secured control over the legislative, executive, and force structures, including the army and intelligence services, he is now allegedly seeking influence over the judiciary as well.
The irregularities described above occurred before the eyes of representatives of European countries that present themselves as the benchmark for democratic elections. This raises a question: why are relatively minor flaws in elections held in Georgia portrayed by European representatives as a “tragedy,” leading to threats of sanctions against the Georgian government, while in Armenia’s case nobody criticizes Pashinyan? It appears that if opposition forces are viewed as loyal to Russia, then any means may be used against them, including restricting their political activity and depriving them of votes. Conversely, if a government adopts an anti-Russian position, then any of its actions are deemed “democratic and legitimate.” All of this demonstrates that concepts such as “human rights” and “democratic elections” are empty slogans for Europe. What matters most is that the geopolitical marketplace functions.
About the author: Fuad Abdullayev is a leading advisor at the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) in Baku, Azerbaijan.
