A letter seen by RFE/RL reveals growing concern about Russian aggression in the Baltic States, speaking of a “deteriorating security environment” amid an “increased frequency of airspace violations and drone incursions.”
The letter was sent to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and signed by the three Baltic European commissioners, Kaja Kallas, Andrius Kubilius, and Valdis Dombrovskis, as well as the Polish and Finnish commissioners.
Dated July 30, the letter was one of a series of alarm bells sounded about Russian aggression over the course of the summer that culminated in CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s surprise visit to Moscow on August 25.
Ratcliffe flew to Moscow to urge the Kremlin against escalating with US allies — particularly Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — sources briefed about the visit confirmed to RFE/RL on April 26.
This follows reporting by The Wall Street Journal on August 6 that cited US intelligence stating that Russia may test NATO resolve with a limited incursion as early as this fall.
Baltic diplomats who spoke to RFE/RL on condition of anonymity confirmed that there was additional intelligence during the summer of Russian false flag operations but no indication about an imminent conventional attack.
They were also keen to point out that such operations might not be limited to the Baltics, a concern reinforced by recent cases of alleged or suspected Russian involvement in assassination attempts, fires, and drone incursions in several NATO countries, including Germany, Poland, and Slovakia.
How Prepared Are The Baltics?
At first glance, the three Baltic states — Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia — ideally placed to counter any type of Russian attack.
They have long warned about and planned for various forms of Russian malign activity. All three have reached or will soon reach NATO’s 2035 target of spending 5 percent of GDP on defense. On top of that, the EU has pledged and begun channeling roughly $14 billion of loans for defense and security investment in the region.
And apart from conventional defense preparations, they are also at the forefront of cutting-edge technology — notably Estonia.
Take DefSecIntel Solutions, an Estonian company whose artificial-intelligence software analyzes captured images and and presents all the information on a single screen.
“We decided to stand by our Ukrainian colleagues; since autumn 2022, we’ve been on the front lines with them. And our technologies are being used there. This has certainly given us a major boost,” Jaan Hein, the company’s vice president, told Current Time. He said the company’s product is being used to protect the borders of Estonia as well as a dozen other countries.
Or take the Estonian start-up Wayren, which has developed software installed on smartphones, tablets, and other devices on the battlefield to protect data exchange from outside interference.
“Estonia is unique in some ways: as a small country with a relatively small industry, we specialize in cutting-edge technologies. Not so much in large platforms like tanks or ships, as larger countries do, but in smart and innovative solutions that can be integrated into such systems, thereby gaining an advantage” company co-founder Henri Harm told Current Time.
But look closer and cracks start to appear.
Negotiations on the next seven-year EU budget have started with a European Commission proposal for a $145-billion pot for security and defense investments. But several net contributors, including the largest, Germany, have made it clear that they want a smaller EU budget going forward.
Many EU officials fear that defense could very likely be one of the areas cut and this fear is apparent in the leaked letter.
Some of its proposals are symbolic, like the entire European Commission “urgently” visiting one of the frontline countries this autumn “as we all see the escalation of threats against the Baltic States.”
Tank Traps Instead Of A Drone Wall
The main demand, however, is for further funding, with the letter calling for some $115 billion to bolster the business and investment environment in the frontline states.
Pointing to growing drone and other activity from Russia, it says “these incidents are already having a negative impact on the region’s business environment and public confidence in security. To prevent further deterioration and reinforce deterrence, visible and timely action is required.”
Among the actions outlined are “rapid response capacity to disruptions in energy supply and towards critical electricity and gas infrastructure, setting up regional stockpiles for essential goods and civil protection assets, shelters and evacuation infrastructure, and preparedness to respond to hybrid, cyber, sabotage, electronic, and information threats.”
Conspicuously absent from the text — and from most EU communications recently — is the “drone wall,” — a proposed project widely discussed last year that the bloc considered funding. The idea was to equip the EU’s entire eastern flank with sensors and capabilities to detect and shoot down unfriendly drones.
Not much has happened in this regard. As one Baltic official put it to RFE/RL: “It’s easier to talk about the drone wall than to build one. But let’s be frank, nobody has this wall yet, not even the Ukrainians.”
The problems are financial, technical, and legal. There is no clarity over who should pay for such an expensive system; key components, including sensors, radars, and an effective command-and-control system, are not yet fully developed; and there is still debate over whether the whole thing should be fully automated or overseen by humans.
Then there is Rail Baltica, another EU-funded project that isn’t going as planned.
Launched in 2015, it was supposed to connect the the Baltic states, whose rail networks still largely use Soviet-era rail gauges, with Poland and the rest of the EU. The original goal of opening the line this year has long been abandoned, while the revised target of 2030 is also in doubt amid spiraling costs, flawed initial planning, constant changes of design, and squabbles within and between the countries.
The rail line is seen as crucial as it would form a key strategic military mobility corridor, maximizing the number of NATO troops and weapons needed to defend the region and negating the so-called Suwalki Gap — a narrow land corridor connecting Poland and Lithuania, sandwiched between Moscow-aligned Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Most military planners believe Moscow would target the gap if it were to attack NATO.
In the meantime — and largely to compensate for this vulnerability — Lithuania this year passed a law on the construction of a military training ground in the corridor and preparatory work has already begun near the village of Kapciamiestis, where up to 4,000 Lithuanian troops and allies from other NATO countries will be able to train.
This is supposed to complement Germany’s 45th Armored Brigade, which is being deployed just north of the gap, and a US-led multinational NATO battlegroup stationed immediately to its south in Poland.
The Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish borders with Belarus are also being fortified with fences and ditches to deter potential military incursions as well as attempts by migrants to cross the border, which the three countries accuse Belarus and Russia of repeatedly facilitating since 2021.
Yet, some wonder if this will suffice, including the former commander of the Lithuanian Armed Forces Valdas Tutkus.
“We’re buying a thousand trucks. We’re building a defensive line, even though we’re well aware that modern warfare won’t be fought with tanks,” he told Current Time.
“As for the Kapciamiestis, if the Defense Ministry had explained it clearly enough, we could have discussed it. But, unfortunately, at the moment, all I’ve heard is: ‘Believe me, we need it,'” he said. “Unfortunately, I haven’t heard any arguments.”
