Earlier this month, a prominent member of the Belarusian opposition in exile laid out an “ideal scenario” for online elections to the Coordination Council, a shadow parliament formed by foes of authoritarian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko: Imagine if 1 million people voted.
That, Paval Latushka suggested, would force Lukashenko to reckon with the democratic opposition and prompt Western governments to champion its interests “in their relations with the regime that usurped power in our country.”
“Would this vote affect the internal political situation in Belarus? Of course it would,” he wrote in a blog post for RFE/RL’s Belarus Service.
But the reality is far from ideal: Over seven days of voting that ended on May 19, a total of 2,113 Belarusian citizens cast ballots in the Coordination Council vote – down from about 6,700 in the last election in 2024.
Disrupted by intense denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks in which organizers suspect state involvement and hampered by a lack of interest inside Belarus, the troubled Coordination Council vote is emblematic of the daunting challenges that face the opposition six years after a presidential election that sparked massive anti-government protests over evidence of fraud and a violent state crackdown whose effects still reverberate.
“The failure of the elections is a symptom of the general crisis of the Belarusian opposition. And in turn, it is an integral part of the Belarusian existential crisis,” political analyst Valer Karbalevich wrote in a May 19 article for RFE/RL’s Belarus Service.
It reflects a disappointing comedown for the opposition in the years since those dynamic days, when unprecedented crowds gathered to support Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who emerged as the opposition candidate and, according to backers, would have beaten Lukashenko if the election results had not been rigged by the state.
‘Political Survival’
It would be hard to overstate the feeling around the time of the election, when it seemed like Belarusians might dislodge Lukashenko, who has extended his rule since 1994 through multiple elections and referendums widely condemned abroad as undemocratic or downright fraudulent.
Today, the situation is bleaker.
Created in 2020, the Coordination Council was supposed to help Lukashenko transfer power to the opposition. Now, none of its delegates lives in Belarus: Almost all members of the democratic opposition have been forced out or have fled the country, and many of those still in Belarus are behind bars.
“The bet on the collapse of Aleksandr Lukashenko due to internal reasons turned out to be in vain. It has stabilized, and authoritarianism is evolving into totalitarianism. Constant terror has eliminated the possibilities for real political activity by the regime’s opponents inside the country,” Karbalevich wrote. “In the absence of real prospects for democratization in Belarus, the main task of the forces in exile is political survival.”
The Coordination Council election gained little purchase among citizens inside the nation of 9 million.
That’s probably partly due to fear of repercussions for participating: Despite propaganda painting it as a toothless structure with “no influence on anything,” Lukashenko’s government “launched a fierce fight against the election campaign,” Karbalevich wrote in a separate analysis during the voting.
In late April, the KGB, as the main Belarusian security agency is still called, branded the lists of candidates “extremist formations” — meaning that anyone voting would risk criminal prosecution. That designation was followed in early May by widespread law enforcement searches of the homes of candidates’ relatives who remain in Belarus.
Then came sophisticated, sustained DDoS attacks on the website of the election, which prompted organizers first to delay the start of voting by a day, to May 12, and then to move it to a different site.
A coalition pairing Latushka with the For Freedom movement won the most votes , about 42 percent. Eight of the nine groups that ran for seats will be represented after clearing the 3 percent threshold.
‘Real Opponents’
If there’s an upside for the opposition in the state’s efforts to quash the campaign, it’s that the negative attention shows that “Lukashenko perceives these institutions as real opponents,” Karbalevich said of the 80-member Coordination Council and the United Transitional Cabinet, an executive branch created by Tsikhanouskaya, leader of the opposition in exile.
“The existence of these ‘shadow’ structures gives the opposition abroad a certain legitimacy,” he said. “And this fact, to a large extent, objectively delegitimizes Lukashenko and his regime.”
State interference or no, though, the anemic turnout for the Coordination Council election raises questions about the relevance of these institutions, particularly inside Belarus, analysts say.
At the same time, Tsikhanouskaya and her team have faced flak from critics who say they focus too heavily on ties with foreign governments and groups while neglecting the problems faced by citizens inside Belarus.
Tsikhanouskaya rejects such criticism. But it would be difficult to deny a related problem for the prospects of the democratic opposition abroad: The unity of 2020 is becoming a thing of the past, and fault lines in the opposition mean the future is uncertain.
Ahead of the election that August, Tsikhanouskaya — a teacher with no political experience at the time — emerged as the opposition candidate after Lukashenko sought to clear his path to a new term by barring potential rivals from the ballot.
In some cases – including that of her husband, Syarhey Tsikhanouski, a popular video blogger who spoke of squashing the “cockroach” Lukashenko — this was done by jailing them on charges critics said were cooked up for precisely that purpose.
Prisoners Released
Tsikhanouski is one of several opposition figures who have been freed and removed from Belarus in a series of releases negotiated by the United States since the start of President Donald Trump’s new term.
Others released include Viktar Babaryka , a banker who had intended to run in 2020 but was arrested that June, and Mariyya Kalesnikava, who headed Babaryka’s campaign, joined forces with Tsikhanouskaya after his jailing, and was herself arrested in September that year.
Kalesnikava, Babaryka, and Tsikhanouski have all steered clear of the Coordination Council since their release, declining to run in the election — a sign that forces once brought together by a common cause may be taking separate paths now.
There’s even evidence of tension between the pair that supporters believe would have become the first couple of Belarus if the 2020 election had been fair, with critics accusing Tsikhanouski of undermining his wife’s team.
Ironically, the release of Kalesnikava, Babaryka, Tsikhanouski, and hundreds of others considered political prisoners points to another challenge for the Belarusian opposition abroad: US engagement with Lukashenko.
With special envoy John Coale leading the US diplomacy, Belarus has freed some 500 prisoners since Trump took office in January 2025, in return for substantial relief from US sanctions on Belarusian potash companies, among others.
Another sign of a thaw in relations: A massive Protestant gathering in Minsk on May 16-17 that featured Franklin Graham, a prominent US preacher who led a prayer at Trump’s second inauguration ceremony.
Coale has suggested that he talks tough with Lukashenko, warning the authoritarian leader at one of their meetings that he was “at the bad guys’ table” along with “Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, China,” and saying Belarus must “start behaving like a normal country” if it wants to “sit at the winners’ table.”
The normalization of relations with the United States — broken off in 2008 by Belarus but now seen as a coveted prize for Lukashenko even as Minsk’s military ties with Moscow tighten — has not materialized. But the man once dubbed “Europe’s last dictator” may feel that the new dialogue with Washington could help him claw back legitimacy in the eyes of the West.
The European Union, meanwhile, may soon be cutting finding for the Belarusian democratic opposition.
Latushka told RFE/RL’s Belarus Service earlier this month that Brussels would reduce support from 30 million euros ($35 million) to 15 million euros next year. Two EU sources subsequently told RFE/RL that there would be some reduction in funding but that it is not likely to be cut in half.
