Europe may be about to witness an increase in Russian-backed attacks targeted at the private sector. Triggered by multiple setbacks across different theatres of operation – Venezuela, Iran, to name a few – experts believe that the Kremlin may resort to stabs at Europe’s soft underbelly to sow discord and chaos.
Writing in The Independent over the weekend, former journalist and Editor of The Independent, Chris Blackhurst, examined Russian efforts to disrupt Europe’s private sector. The ‘grey zone assaults’, as Blackhurst put it, are deniable espionage and sabotage operations carried out by a network of non-state actors against European companies on Russia’s behalf.
In addition to the broader point about the threat to Europe, the piece cited specific examples of both proven and suspected ‘grey-zone’ actors. Jan Marsalek, formerly of Wirecard, is the best-known example of this, at least by the general public. But Marsalek is the exception which proves the rule, with many of these operations being little-known and flying under the radar.
As one such possible example, Blackhurst points to Alexander Kirzhnev, a Russian national wanted by the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court in Ukraine for organising a deliberate fraud against the state. Specifically, the Independent reports on Ukrainian allegations that he established a ‘bogus’ US company to fulfil an order for ammunition to the Ukrainian military that never materialised. Having been through the US courts and now subject to a Ukrainian criminal investigation, this operation resulted in a significant waste of the country’s time, effort and money, all while furthering Russia’s own interests – typical goals of Russian ‘grey-zone’ activity.
Kirzhnev has been subject to repeated court summons by the Ukrainian authorities to answer for his alleged crimes, as yet to no avail. The most recent, issued less than a month ago, sets out a series of dates in 2026 for him to appear. It is not expected he will do so and will likely be tried in absentia. He is known to have fled to Croatia in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The company involved in that scandal, Gray Fox, has a number of individuals with dubious records connected to the organisation. The company, incorporated in 2016 and disbanded in 2021, saw one of its three directors, Dale Scott Wood, sentenced to 12 years in jail for ‘orchestrating an international fraud scheme’. Manuele Wernli, a Swiss businessman, sat on the company’s board and as Head of Internal Audit and Technology. In addition to Gray Fox, Wernli is connected with numerous failed energy projects across Europe, almost always involving Russian state actors. In Serbia, Wernli was CEO of Mentor Energy, a company looking to build a major gas power plant in the country. The project ultimately failed but it placed Wernli into direct contact with Russian-backed actors, such as Gazprom, and the far-right Serbian Radical Party.
As with the Gray Fox operation, the failure of such projects causes significant disruption, and often impedes strategic initiatives, setting European allies back in both time and resources. These ‘failings’ often align with Moscow’s broader geostrategic interests. This particular example also demonstrates how ‘grey-zone’ actors aren’t necessarily of Russian nationality, but could be anyone motivated by money, ideology or intrigue.
While some operators have managed to evade serious punishment to date, Blackhurst highlights the case of Yuri Orekhov, who hasn’t been so fortunate. Orekhov is one of five Russian nationals charged in New York with attempts to illegally obtain American military technology and embargoed oil out of Venezuela. Through a complex myriad of shell organisations and cryptocurrency, Orekhov was attempting to sell millions of barrels to Chinese and Russian buyers.
Following an investigation by Task Force KleptoCapture, a sanctions-enforcement investigative unit, Orekhov and his companies were subsequently placed on the U.S. sanctions list by the Biden Administration. It was clear, in their view, that he was supporting Russian military interests in Ukraine through his attempts to procure sensitive technology. Orekhov is reportedly currently residing in Germany, whose courts refused to extradite him to the US. This raises questions about how he can continue to reside in a NATO country allied to both the United States and Ukraine with impunity, and how the EU has not taken note of the case.
These actors are not Russian officials. They do not hold positions in the Russian Government or military. On paper, the only thing which ties them to the Russian state is their passports (and in Wernli’s case, not even that). They are fully deniable, but what isn’t deniable is who benefits from their actions.
2026 is anticipated to be a year when the pressure to achieve a Russia-Ukraine settlement ramps up significantly. Already, Western European leaders are making strong noises about putting military boots on the ground in Ukraine postwar, and taking action against Russia’s ‘dark fleet’.
It can therefore be expected that Russia’s grey-zone activities will ramp up as diplomatic negotiations intensify. Moscow would likely view these actions as a useful and deniable arms-length way to strengthen its bargaining position. The EU, UK and other key European nations will be on high alert to coordinate efforts against ‘grey-zone’ activities. As Blackhurst concludes, ‘we must expand our view of just how far the Kremlin will go, in all walks of life, to cause destruction and spread disquiet’.
Photo by Julia Kadel on Unsplash
