WASHINGTON — Retired four-star General David Petraeus is a veteran of nearly four decades in the US Army, commanding US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan before serving as director of the CIA in 2011-12.
In an interview with RFE/RL on March 2, Petraeus endorsed the Trump administration’s frank account of operations, noting substantial achievements alongside losses of personnel and aircraft.
He said the consequences of killing Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other senior officials are uncertain until a successor emerges, and while the stated US aim of the military action is to create conditions that might allow Iranians — or disaffected regime elements — to topple the Islamic republic’s leadership, he stresses it remains to be seen whether that is realistic.
RFE/RL: What is your snapshot reaction to the remarks we just heard from the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Petraeus: I thought that the secretary and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs laid out a very sober, forthright, comprehensive description of what it is that we have sought to do: in general terms describing what we have done and achieved, which is extraordinarily impressive, while also acknowledging the risks and challenges and the loss of four of our soldiers and three of our F-15s.
RFE/RL: US officials have described the strategy as creating an opening for Iran and allowing the Iranian people to decide their future. Let me turn to succession: What does the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei mean? How does his removal in a decapitation strike alter the internal balance of power within the Islamic republic?
Petraeus: The truth is, we do not yet know, and we will not have the answer until we know who the replacement will be. Supposedly there was a succession plan, but it will actually be pursued according to the constitution, which, as you know, calls for an interim council of the president, the senior judicial official, and a cleric, and then ultimately the Assembly of Experts will convene and select the new supreme leader.
Until we know the new supreme leader and whether or not he is a pragmatist or another hardcore ideologue like the two predecessors, it is difficult to assess.
What I would note is that it is not just the supreme leader who has been killed; it is dozens of other significant regime figures — the equivalent, if you will, of the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and a number of other very important leaders. While they all have deputies, there will be disruption to their capabilities, as there already is.
It is pretty clear that they are struggling to coordinate the kinds of mass strikes they employed during the 12-day war. There have certainly been many Iranian strike orders, but it appears there has been a delegation of authority to subordinate units to take action against what were presumably previously approved targets.
Some of these efforts have gotten through. Hundreds and thousands of them have been knocked down. There have been strikes in many countries in the region. Most have been intercepted, but some have gotten through and done damage to some of our bases in the region. One drone strike apparently killed three soldiers in Kuwait. There was also a tragedy in Israel, where a bomb shelter was hit with significant loss of life.
At the end of the day, what the president has made clear — noting that in his first speech he referred to regime change, and later clarified — is that US, Israeli, and other operations are intended to create conditions that could allow the people, and perhaps disaffected elements of the regime forces, to topple the regime. Whether that is realistic remains to be seen.
RFE/RL: The White House says Iran wants to restart negotiations and that the president will speak with whoever is in charge. At the same time, senior Iranian security officials have publicly rejected talks. If the US does reopen talk, does it mean the regime get to stay in control, even if it is badly damaged?
Petraeus: Again, given that we are not going in on the ground to take it out, I am not sure what the other options are. I think the better question is whether we should give the Iranians any opportunity to negotiate. I think the answer should be no.
This should be a conversation between the victor and the vanquished — even if the vanquished is still in control, but very heavily damaged, battered, and defenseless.
They really have no defenses left of considerable capability against air or missile attack. This should largely be a one-way conversation: You do not enrich uranium anymore, you do not replenish or reconstitute your missile force, and you stop supporting murderous proxies in the region that have killed thousands of Americans, Israelis, and Arabs throughout the greater Gulf states.
That is how that so-called negotiation should go. Whether that proves viable remains to be seen. If Iran does not agree, we have the capability to revisit the issue, as we have over the last several days.
RFE/RL: Given your experience in the region, should we expect consolidation by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, fragmentation within the clerical establishment, or the emergence of an alternative center of authority? Who moves next? Does this increase the likelihood of state collapse or internal conflict, or could it open space for a different political trajectory?
Petraeus: It does offer the possibility of splintering. Karim Sadjadpour — whom I respect highly for his analysis — quoted an Iranian academic who observed that it used to be that the regime was 80 percent true believers — hard-liners and fundamentalists — and 20 percent charlatans, those who were along for the ride. The academic now says it is 80 percent charlatans and 20 percent true believers.
If that is the case, this would be the moment for pragmatists to take control of the regime, noting that what the regime has achieved since 1979 is a 99 percent devaluation of the Iranian rial, international isolation, and domestic poverty. That is not a particularly great record of achievement.
Iran has among the top crude oil reserves in the world — I believe third — and second in natural gas reserves, along with an educated population and a longstanding civilization. When might someone stand up and say, “Let’s stop the madness”? What has enriching uranium brought? What has arming proxies in the Middle East brought? What have actions that resulted in the deaths of so many Arab, Israeli, and even American neighbors brought?
RFE/RL: If regime change is to come from within, how realistic is that, given that ordinary Iranians are unarmed and lack organization?
Petraeus: They do not have arms, organization, or real military capability. That can only come from elements within the regime, which have a monopoly on military power and the leadership that could pull away some members of the regime and rally the people.
It has been observed that in situations like this, the people with the most guns and the greatest willingness to be brutal often prevail. But there have also been the color revolutions that ended some authoritarian regimes after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. That gives some hope.
Still, the base case is that the regime will be very battered, bloodied, and diminished, but sufficiently cohesive to survive — surviving with enormous damage, loss, and destruction.
RFE/RL: In the immediate term, what policies should Washington prioritize to protect regional stability while advancing its objectives
Petraeus: The United States, Israel, and others should reduce as quickly as possible Iran’s retaliatory means — its ability to disrupt freedom of navigation in the Gulf, mine the Strait of Hormuz, or attack vessels there. I believe two vessels were hit in the broader area of the strait.
We should reduce its ability to reconstitute its most threatening capabilities — not just missiles and launchers but also manufacturing facilities. The same applies to drones, short- and long-range, and to naval vessels capable of disrupting the Gulf. The United States reportedly took out approximately nine such vessels yesterday.
We should also integrate and strengthen defenses against Iranian missiles and drones and provide a steadying, coordinating role. When I commanded Central Command, there were times when Gulf states would not share their air-defense picture with each other, but they would share it with us.
Over the longer term, the goal should be an Iran that is no longer remotely as threatening, cannot enrich uranium, cannot field missiles, and does not support proxies. If it does not agree, Israel and/or the United States may have to demonstrate military capability again.
RFE/RL: How will these developments affect Iran’s proxy groups across the region? How should the United States and its partners prepare for possible escalation?
Petraeus: First, understand the proxies’ capabilities. They are all dramatically degraded — Hezbollah among them — although they did fire a few rockets or missiles into Israel yesterday, for which they will be hammered. Hamas is no longer a significant strategic threat, though it remains a challenge because it is still the strongest armed force in populated parts of Gaza. Syria is no longer an ally for Iran.
They are already dramatically diminished. The key is preparedness for what they might attempt in support of Iran’s endeavors. Israel’s approach since 9/11 has changed — it will not allow threats to reconstitute as they did in the past.
