If a student and part-time model can turn out to be behind a one-off gig for Russia, so could thousands of others in Britain, Germany, Poland, Lithuania — essentially any Western country. The gig model works well for Russia because it allows it to easily recruit freelancers, or “disposable agents” as they’re sometimes called.
“The more eye-catching shift this year has been Russian state actors turning to proxies for their dirty work, including private intelligence operatives and criminals from both the U.K. and third countries,” MI5 Director General Ken McCallum said last October.
The arrangement works well for the freelancers, too, as they can take on gigs without committing to a career in the Kremlin’s service.
But as the incidents to date illustrate, this type of gig gray-zone aggression is highly disruptive and dangerous. We risk the prospect of constant attacks, while the taskmasters on the other side of the chat watch their gig workers sow destruction as their own involvement remains virtually impossible to prove, let alone prosecute or avenge. And they don’t just operate from Russia either — other hostile states are already using the gig model and are likely to expand it.
For law enforcement, tackling this problem is almost impossible, especially in open societies where we don’t track people’s every move the way, say, China does. But if we all do our part, we’ll at least have a chance of curtailing this sinister campaign. Citizens can report situations that look unusual, while companies and authorities can step up the surveillance of their facilities — as all manner of gig attacks are likely to be carried out around buildings.
Dismantling this new mode of operation won’t be as easy as “see it, say it, sorted.” However, if most of us decide to be more alert and report our findings, criminals will be less tempted to do the dirty deeds of hostile states. No doubt those who have since been arrested now regret their part in this scheme.
