The alleged presence of senior ex-officials from Germany and Russia in Baku in July has caused significant speculations about the potential resumption of informal contact between Moscow and Berlin. However, the geopolitical significance of the event is not only in the potential talks but also in the location of these meetings, writes Yunis Gurbanov.
According to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (pictured), former Chief of German Chancellery Ronald Pofalla and former Brandenburg Minister-President Matthias Platzeck were in Baku from Berlin in July 12-14. At the same time, former Prime Minister of Russia and the Board Chairman of the company Gazprom Viktor Zubkov and Valery Fadeyev, the Chairman of Russia’s Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights, were in Baku coming from Moscow. President Aliyev mentioned that neither side had communicated this to Azerbaijan and there was no information about the nature of the talks. However, there was reason to believe that a secret meeting had been held because of the similar travel plans.
The way in which the Azerbaijani president reacted was telling. The authorities in Baku did not take credit for the initiative, nor did they try to exaggerate their role in this situation by claiming mediator status in this particular case; rather, the president noted that the territory of Azerbaijan had been used for the meeting without his prior notice, but stated that any communication that might contribute to resolving the war between Russia and Ukraine is welcome.
Apart from reflecting diplomatic tact and self-confidence, the reaction to this situation poses another question: why have such meetings between Russian and Western officials become possible in Baku?
Why has Baku become politically workable?
After the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2022, the official ties between Moscow and the majority of European countries have worsened dramatically. The diplomatic contacts have become scarce, the political trust has been lost completely, and any attempt to start negotiations may lead to controversy within the national politics. In such circumstances, informal diplomacy cannot rely only on willingness of its participants; it needs a neutral space which would be safe, confidential, logistically convenient and politically acceptable for the people coming from different geopolitical blocks.
Azerbaijan becomes increasingly suitable for this purpose because it chose neither isolation nor automatic association. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is characterized by strategic autonomy when cooperation takes place with many centres of power without submission to them.
Strategic alliance exists between Baku and Turkey, energy and connectivity partnership continues developing with the European Union, Azerbaijan also has substantial relations with Central Asia and diplomatic contacts with Russia. At the same time, Azerbaijan is supportive of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and provides it with humanitarian aid. Despite the difference in these relations in terms of intensity and content, Azerbaijan finds itself in a unique geopolitical position.
Azerbaijan’s suitability does not depend upon textbook neutrality. Baku has clearly defined national interests, established alliances and its own positions on regional and international questions. Its diplomatic value instead derives from its ability to engage several competing actors without becoming an instrument of any one of them.
This is particularly important in relations with Russia. Azerbaijan has demonstrated that maintaining dialogue with Moscow does not mean accepting political pressure or compromising sovereign interests. Relations have experienced serious strains, especially following the December 2024 crash of an Azerbaijani passenger aircraft and subsequent disputes between the two countries. Nevertheless, Baku has retained the capacity to defend its position firmly while avoiding a complete breakdown in communication.
That combination of independence and engagement enhances Azerbaijan’s credibility. Moscow understands that Baku is not a Western proxy. European actors, meanwhile, recognise that Azerbaijan is not politically controlled by Russia. This does not make Azerbaijan neutral between Russia and the West; it makes it politically workable for both.
Backchannels in a fragmented international order
The incident in Baku is yet another illustration of the increasing significance of back-channel diplomacy. The process of back-channel diplomacy should be differentiated from mediation and formal negotiations aimed at peace-making. Mediator usually plays the role recognized by all sides, communicates with the main actors involved and helps formulate an agreement between them. Back-channel diplomacy is a smaller process involving private exchanges aimed at assessing a situation, testing ideas and finding out whether it is possible to move to more formal negotiations.
The participants allegedly participating in meetings in Baku seem to prove this point. Pofalla once worked in the office of Angela Merkel being head of the Federal Chancellery in Germany and was chairman of the Petersburg Dialogue, a German-Russian discussion that stopped working due to worsening of relations between the two countries. Platzeck is the former head of the German Social Democratic Party and a person who was actively involved in German-Russian discussions. As for Zubkov and Fadeyev, they are prominent Russian figures – the former prime minister of Russia and an adviser in Moscow respectively.
They were not an official negotiating channel, and the German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claimed that he had no knowledge of the alleged meeting. However, there are cases where previous diplomats manage to convey messages, which the current administrations are still not ready to discuss officially. Their non-official status can be regarded as a weakness but can also become an advantage in politics.
The fact that such meetings reportedly took place in Baku already after 2024 means that the capital of Azerbaijan was not selected just for one meeting. Rather, it seems that it offers exactly what is required for the unofficial talks to take place – flights from any point, high level of security, low media presence, and political situation, which does not consider the arrival of Russian or European diplomats to be an unusual thing.
This demonstrates that something is changing in diplomacy in general. With the growing division in the world’s order, it is not only traditional powers that shape the diplomatic game. The middle powers of a new generation are getting the diplomatic importance because of their ability to maintain relationships beyond political barriers.
This indicates that a broader change is taking place in diplomacy. With the international system becoming increasingly fragmented, the old-style great powers are not the only actors influencing diplomacy. A new set of strategically located middle powers is gaining diplomatic clout through their ability to maintain ties irrespective of political differences.
Azerbaijan is among those countries becoming increasingly part of this new set of nations. Its influence is not solely based on its military strength or economic might. It is based on geographical location, importance in energy, connectivity, political stability, and pursuing an independent foreign policy. Baku can talk to Moscow without representing the latter. Baku can work with Europe without compromising its freedom of action. Baku can support the independence of Ukraine while retaining a working relationship with Russia.
More than a venue, but not yet a mediator
The fact that Baku has turned out to be a venue for such dialogue must not be overstated. It is unrealistic to expect Azerbaijan on its own to be able to solve the problems of the Russia–Ukraine war or mend fences between Russia and Europe, nor can it take the place of consultations involving Russia, Ukraine, the U.S., and Europe.
However, it must not be forgotten that creating a political space is also a valuable diplomatic tool. Diplomacy in international relations does not begin until presidents meet at the negotiating table. Much sooner than that, governments and politically influential intermediaries have already made efforts to get acquainted with their opponents’ goals, positions, and possibilities of making concessions. In time of confrontation, just the existence of these channels may help avoid mistakes and prepare for further negotiations.
Baku’s possible function is thus more one of facilitating communication rather than dictating solutions. Azerbaijan could offer a safe and politically acceptable setting for exploratory meetings without making any institutional commitments at that point. This is less ambitious than mediation, but perhaps more realistic and useful given current circumstances.
The fact that Germans and Russians apparently chose Baku without involving the Azerbaijani government in their decision is, paradoxically, proof of Azerbaijan’s diplomatic credentials. It would seem that Azerbaijan was considered a sufficiently safe and acceptable site for such a politically charged meeting. Azerbaijan did not have to market itself as a diplomatic center – the mere fact that participants had chosen to meet there was a testament to that effect.
Conclusion
It takes more than one unofficial meeting to create a new tradition of diplomacy, and Azerbaijan’s part in this process is far from decisive either. The ultimate resolution of the Russia-Ukraine dispute rests, above all, with the respective decisions taken in Moscow, Kyiv, Washington and major European capitals. However, diplomacy is never exclusively about formal negotiation process; it also hinges upon the presence of politically feasible zones for the continued exchange of views even amidst sharp strategic divergences.
The recent contacts between the Germans and Russians in Baku appear to be indicative of this trend. Not surprisingly, this is a logical result of a well-calculated policy line, which is based on such principles as strategic independence, political credibility in the region and proactive cooperation with alternative centres of influence. In the evermore fragmented international environment, this type of approach seems bound to become increasingly important.
It is yet to be seen whether Baku will emerge as a regular location for non-official contacts between Russia and the West. Nevertheless, the latest trends suggest that Azerbaijan is forging its own path within international diplomacy—this time not as a mediator replacing more traditional ones, but as a provider of what has become increasingly rare: political ground for dialogue.
