More than three years after the invasion of Ukraine triggered sweeping Western sanctions, Russian commercial networks are not disappearing from global markets -they are reorganising.
Increasingly, that reorganisation is taking place through the Gulf.
While the UAE has attracted most international attention as a hub for Russian capital and commodities trading since 2022, Oman is quietly emerging as a second, and potentially more strategically important, partner in Moscow’s wider economic pivot away from Europe.
The relationship is no longer confined to diplomacy. It is expanding rapidly across trade, logistics, energy, food security, finance, tourism and strategic investment.
That acceleration is visible in the numbers. Bilateral trade between Oman and Russia grew by more than 60% between 2020 and 2024, while the number of Russian-linked businesses registered in Oman has risen sharply as Muscat positions itself as a gateway connecting the Gulf, Africa and the Indian Ocean.
Moscow has been unusually explicit about the strategic importance it now places on Oman.
“We consider Oman as a new window not only to the Arab world, but also a kind of transit point for expanding our presence in Western Asia and Africa,” Russia’s Economy Minister Maxim Reshetnikov said in 2024. He separately described Oman as “Russia’s entry point to the market of the Persian Gulf countries”, remarks that underline how central Muscat has become to Moscow’s post-Ukraine economic pivot.
What was once a relatively modest bilateral relationship is now evolving into a broader strategic partnership centred on logistics corridors, port infrastructure, agriculture, food security, transport connectivity and investment coordination – sectors that have become increasingly important to Moscow since the disruption of its traditional commercial routes into Europe after the invasion of Ukraine.
For Russia, Oman offers several strategic advantages simultaneously.
Unlike the UAE, Muscat has attracted comparatively limited Western scrutiny despite becoming an increasingly important logistics and financial hub. Oman has also maintained its longstanding foreign policy posture of neutrality and balanced diplomacy, preserving working relationships with Russia, the West, Iran and China simultaneously.
That neutrality makes Oman particularly attractive to Russian-linked commercial networks seeking stable international partners outside the Western sanctions sphere.
Russian officials have publicly described Oman as a future logistics and transport hub for Russian trade into the Gulf and Africa, particularly through the development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and related shipping routes. Discussions between both governments have increasingly centred on cargo infrastructure, grain exports, agricultural projects and maritime logistics.
The deepening relationship is also becoming increasingly institutionalised. In 2026, Muscat launched the Oman-Russia International Exhibition under the slogan “From Oman to the World”, describing the initiative as a platform for long-term investment partnerships between Russian and Omani businesses. Organisers stated that the exhibition was intended to position Oman as a strategic economic hub linking Russia to the Gulf, Africa and wider international markets, while officials from both countries confirmed that preparations were underway to expand bilateral governmental and investment coordination mechanisms.
The relationship is also expanding well beyond energy and commodities.
In 2025, Oman hosted a delegation representing 54 Russian tourism companies as part of a broader push to deepen bilateral cooperation across the travel and hospitality sectors. Oman opened a dedicated tourism office in Russia in late 2024, while direct Oman Air flights between Muscat and Moscow have expanded alongside new mutual visa exemptions between the two countries. Russian visitor numbers to Oman exceeded 44,000 in 2024, reflecting rapidly growing economic and people-to-people connectivity between the two states.
The developments point to something larger than routine bilateral trade expansion. They suggest Oman is increasingly positioning itself as a stable Gulf-based platform through which Russia can maintain and expand international commercial relationships despite growing separation from Western financial and economic systems.
The emphasis on food security and grain infrastructure is especially notable.
Since the invasion of Ukraine, grain has become a geopolitical commodity in its own right. Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian exports, repeated attacks on agricultural infrastructure and Moscow’s growing dominance in global wheat exports have transformed food supply chains into a matter of strategic importance for governments across Europe, Africa and the Middle East.
Against that backdrop, the growing intersection between Russian commodities networks and Omani sovereign-linked capital takes on wider geopolitical significance.
One example is the recent restructuring surrounding Brazilian grain trader Agribrasil.
Although Brazil’s company registry still formally lists Agribrasil as being owned by chairman and CEO Frederico Jose Humberg, Humberg announced in July 2025 that the company had been sold to Solaris Brazil Trading Holding SA. That entity is wholly owned by Dubai-based ME Solaris Commodities Holding Ltd.
Historically, ME Solaris was controlled by Russian businessman Vladimir Sokolov through ME Grain Services Holding Ltd. While the shareholder structure has evolved since the Ukraine war, Sokolov remains an owner alongside three Omani investment vehicles connected to the Oman Investment Authority, the Sultanate’s sovereign wealth fund.
The significance of the transaction lies less in Agribrasil itself than in what the ownership structure appears to represent: the convergence of Omani sovereign-linked capital with Russian commodities expertise and trading networks in strategically important agricultural supply chains.
Agribrasil therefore appears not as an isolated transaction, but as part of a broader post-2022 realignment in which Russian-linked operators are rebuilding international commodities platforms through Gulf-backed structures.
The involvement of Omani sovereign-linked investment vehicles in the Solaris structure also reflects a broader post-Ukraine pattern in which Gulf sovereign wealth funds have continued engaging with Russian state-linked businesses and investment platforms despite Western economic isolation efforts. Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund retained its major stake in Russian energy giant Rosneft after the invasion of Ukraine, while Russia’s sovereign wealth fund RDIF expanded investment cooperation with the Qatar Investment Authority through a new €2bn joint platform announced in 2025. Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund have also maintained significant strategic investment relationships connected to Russian state-linked economic structures in the post-war period.
That pattern is increasingly visible across the wider Russian-Omani economic relationship.
Public statements from both governments have repeatedly identified agriculture and food security as priority sectors for future cooperation. Oman has simultaneously been expanding its role as a regional logistics hub through ports such as Duqm, which sits outside the Strait of Hormuz and has become strategically attractive for international shipping and commodities flows.
For Moscow, these emerging Gulf logistics routes are becoming increasingly important as sanctions pressure and geopolitical tensions continue to reshape global trade.
The Solaris structure itself appears emblematic of this wider transition.
The company emerged from the restructuring of Solaris Commodities SA, a Swiss trading house that effectively collapsed amid the geopolitical fallout from the Ukraine war. Its subsequent relocation from Switzerland to Dubai mirrors a much broader migration of Russian-linked commodity groups away from European jurisdictions and toward Gulf financial centres after sanctions scrutiny intensified following 2022.
The personnel involved also reinforce the continuity of Russian state-linked commercial networks beneath these new Gulf-based structures.
Sokolov himself worked for VTB between 2005 and 2013. Several senior Solaris executives also previously held positions at VTB Capital, the investment banking arm of Russia’s state-owned VTB Bank, long regarded as one of the Kremlin’s principal international financial instruments.
Anatoly Sukhodolov, now an Executive Director at Solaris, spent a decade at VTB Capital Plc. Alexander Pokrasenko, currently a trader at Solaris, was previously a Director at VTB Capital for more than ten years. Oleg Pankratov, Solaris’ regional CEO and Head of Investment, also spent approximately 15 years at VTB Capital before leaving around 2022.
The concentration of former VTB personnel inside Solaris suggests that while the jurisdictions and ownership structures may have changed, much of the underlying expertise and network continuity remains intact.
That continuity becomes more notable when viewed against the wider history of VTB and Russia’s use of commercial and financial institutions to project geopolitical influence abroad.
A recent Financial Times investigation into Gemcorp, the London-based emerging markets investment group founded by former VTB Capital chief Atanas Bostandjiev, highlighted how Russian-linked investment and commodities structures historically operated alongside Moscow’s broader geopolitical objectives in Africa.
The FT investigation described VTB as having functioned for years as a tool of Russian state influence in emerging markets, often operating alongside wider diplomatic and commercial objectives. It also documented how Russian-linked commercial structures increasingly pivoted through Gulf jurisdictions after sanctions pressure intensified following both Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine.
Solaris appears to fit squarely within that same post-2022 evolution.
Prior to the Ukraine war, Solaris Commodities SA maintained substantial trading relationships with Demetra Trading/Holdings, one of Russia’s largest agricultural trading groups. Demetra itself appears closely tied to VTB: LLC Demetra Trading is almost entirely owned by LLC Demetra Holdings, while those shares are pledged against VTB, suggesting continuing financial leverage or influence by the state-owned bank.
There is also notable overlap in personnel between Demetra and Solaris.
Solaris’ current CFO, Nikolai Lvov, previously served as deputy CFO at Demetra Holding before joining Solaris in 2022. In 2025 Solaris appointed Ilya Shnayderman as Head of Risk after he held the same role at Demetra Holding.
Taken together, the picture that emerges is not simply one of expanding bilateral trade between Oman and Russia, but the gradual construction of a broader economic architecture linking Gulf capital, logistics hubs and sovereign investment with Russian commodities expertise and trading networks.
For Western policymakers, the implications may be significant.
While sanctions have undoubtedly disrupted Russia’s traditional commercial infrastructure in Europe, they may also be accelerating the development of alternative financial and trading ecosystems centred around the Gulf, systems in which Russian-linked networks continue to operate through new jurisdictions, new partnerships and increasingly sophisticated ownership structures.
