On 5 February 2026 the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START ) expired – a significant turning point in international security. At the Munich Security Conference which ran from 13th to 15th February New START barely got a mention, writes Dick Roche.
New START was signed in Prague on 8 April 2010 by US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. It succeeded the earlier Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which had expired in December 2009.
Growing concern that key Cold War–era arms control treaties were expiring, combined with strong anti-war sentiment following the Second Gulf War, prompted, Barak Obama during the 2008 US elections, to pledge that if elected he would promote a world free of nuclear weapons.
Shortly after taking office in 2009, President Obama initiated talks with President Medvedev. on renewing strategic arms control. Following their meeting in London in April 2009 negotiations, which went on for nearly a year, got underway. A formal agreement was announced in March 2010, a treaty was initialled the following month in Prague and after a lengthy ratification process in the US Senate, New START entered into force on 5 February 2011.
Under its terms, the United States and Russia agreed to reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 each. The treaty also limited deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles , and heavy bombers to 700, while allowing a total of 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers.
These reductions built upon the achievements of the 1991 START I agreement. That treaty led to the dismantling or retirement of nearly 80 percent of the strategic nuclear weapons in operation at the treaty’s outset—an often overlooked success of post–Cold War arms control.
In addition to arms limits, New START included a rigorous verification regime. On-site inspections, regular data exchanges, and unique identifiers for strategic delivery systems allowed both sides to monitor compliance. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and heavy bombers were all subject to identification and tracking measures designed to ensure transparency. Although the inspection system occasionally prompted political complaints from either side, it played a crucial role in maintaining confidence. Verification reduced speculation, limited paranoia, and helped prevent misunderstandings or accidents. Most importantly, it provided both governments with the reassurance necessary to implement meaningful reductions in nuclear forces.
The treaty scheduled to expire on 5 February 2021 contained provision for an extension of up to five years. Renewal was contentious during the first Trump administration. Hawkish officials argued that the treaty constrained US capabilities while failing to address emerging threats. National Security Advisor John Bolton was particularly critical. President Donald Trump expressed concern that China—whose nuclear arsenal has been expanding—was not a party to the treaty.
The 2020 election delivered a solution: One week after President Joe Biden’s inauguration in January 2021, the White House and the Kremlin announced the extension of New START for a five-year period, The extension preserved the treaty until 5th February 2026.
In October 2025, with the treaty’s expiration coming into view President Putin, proposed extending New START for an additional year. The offer was not accepted. President Trump suggested instead that experts from both countries should negotiate a “new, improved and modernized treaty” capable of lasting longer addressing contemporary security concerns, and with China included.
With the treaty’s expiration the world has entered less predictable territory. In addition to removing weapon limits the expiry ends the verification systems that provided transparency and predictability.
Russia has indicated that it intends to observe the treaty’s previous limits as long as the United States does the same, while welcome that is no guarantee.
Arms control advocates warn that the absence of binding constraints will almost inevitably accelerate renewed nuclear competition with new weapons systems and delivery technologies emerging.
When the expiry date arrived, UN Secretary-General António Guterres described the moment as “a grave moment for international peace and security” and urged both countries to negotiate a new agreement without delay.
The Kremlin also warned that the expiration of the treaty would increase global danger. Dmitry Peskov spoke of the world heading into a more dangerous period.
Oddly at this month’s Munich Security Conference the end of New START attracted little attention.
While an EU delegation at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament held in Geneva in January encouraged the United States and Russia to continue observing the treaty’s limits, the tone was different in Munich. The focus was on strengthening European military capabilities. President von der Leyen spoke of the need to develop a “European backbone of strategic enablers”, saying long-standing taboos about defence policy should be reconsidered.
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas stressed the importance of defending Europe, stabilizing its neighbourhood, and strengthening global partnerships.
The expiration of New START, the broader collapse of nuclear arms control or the idea that the EU could play a role in promoting a move back from the brink didn’t feature.
The overall tone of MSC 2026 contained uncomfortable echoes of the Cold War doctrine of “peace through strength”: greater military spending, stronger defence industries, and expanded capabilities will deter aggression and ensure stability. Mutual assured destruction was not mentioned but M.A.D was in the air.
Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez stood out as the one EU leader pushing back against the growing idea of peace through strength. While supporting the view that Europe needed to coordinate on defence – without nuclearization – he argued, for more arms control, for avoiding a nuclear arms race and for a treaty to replace New START.
There are understandable reasons for the increased talk about defence. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped the continent’s security environment. Uncertainties about the direction of US policies and concerns about China have added concerns.
Shifting too far toward a defence-first narrative risks forgetting that the European Union was built on the premise that cooperation, economic integration, and shared institutions prevent conflict. This history gives the EU credibility as an advocate for multilateralism, international law, and peaceful conflict resolution.
A defence-first narrative weakens that distinctive identity. Europe possesses tools that extend beyond military power: diplomatic networks, economic leverage, development assistance, and regulatory influence. These instruments give the EU more leverage to preventing escalation and promote negotiated settlements than talk about growing a backbone of strategic enablers
There is a strategic argument for pressing for more arms control rather than more weapons. By prioritizing nuclear restraint, conflict prevention, and diplomatic engagement, the European Union could position itself as a credible intermediary rather than as a follower.
Public opinion within Europe leans towards that view. Support for the EU has long been tied to its image as a peace project. The 2012 Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union recognised EU success in promoting reconciliation and stability. If EU leaders give the appearance of shifting towards militarism they risk diluting a narrative central to the European project.
The EU has a strong interest in preventing the collapse of global nuclear arms control. It could play a constructive role in encouraging a global dialogue on a revised strategic arms agreement, a dialogue encompassing more than just Washington and Moscow. While the EU is not a superpower and should not aspire to be one it has significant influence and close relationships that could steer a confused world away from the brink.
A renewed agreement could build upon the foundations established by New START and START 1 while addressing emerging challenges. Advances in missile technology, evolving nuclear doctrines, and the potential emergence of additional nuclear powers all require updated frameworks. European diplomacy could help convene discussions, support verification mechanisms, and promote broader participation in future arms control arrangements.
At a time when the global security environment is becoming increasingly militarized, leadership on nuclear restraint would reinforce Europe’s founding principles while contributing to international stability. The expiration of New START marks the end of an important chapter in arms control—it could also serve as a catalyst for renewed engagement on peace.
Dick Roche is a former Irish minister for European affairs.
