The recent expansion of the Middle Corridor through new multimodal routes marks a notable shift in Eurasian connectivity. What was long discussed primarily as a geopolitical alternative is increasingly taking shape as a functional and diversified transport system. The convergence of multimodal pilot operations, long-delayed but now advancing rail projects, port modernization, and changing geopolitical risk perceptions suggests a transition from conceptual planning toward more structured implementation, writes Vusal Guliyev, Leading Advisor at the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center).
The inauguration of a new multimodal freight corridor in mid-October illustrates this shift. A pilot shipment carrying consumer goods and industrial equipment departed from Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang region and moved westward across Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan before crossing the Caspian Sea toward Azerbaijan. Although limited in volume, the operation demonstrated the technical feasibility and political coordination required to link Central Asia more directly with trans-Eurasian transport routes. Its significance lies less in immediate commercial impact than in its demonstration of regulatory interoperability and cross-border coordination across multiple jurisdictions.
This development challenges long-standing assumptions about Central Asia’s position in regional and global trade systems. Historically, the region has been conceptualized as a peripheral and landlocked space whose economic geography was shaped by Soviet-era infrastructure legacies and northbound transport corridors routed through Russia and Kazakhstan. These inherited pathways structured trade flows in ways that limited diversification, reinforced external dependence, and confined Central Asia largely to the role of a raw-material supplier within global value chains. Connectivity, in this context, functioned less as a source of strategic agency than as a constraint embedded in geography and path-dependent infrastructure. The emergence of a China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan multimodal corridor complicates this inherited model. By integrating road, rail, and maritime transport and linking inland China to the Caspian basin, the corridor introduces a multidirectional connectivity logic that weakens reliance on a single transit axis. Rather than eliminating structural constraints, it redistributes them, expanding the range of routing options available to regional states. In political economy terms, this shift enhances strategic optionality and reduces exposure to geopolitical and commercial shocks concentrated along any one corridor. As Central Asia becomes increasingly embedded within intersecting east–west and north–south flows, its role begins to evolve from that of a landlocked periphery to a land-linked intermediary within Eurasia’s emerging connectivity architecture.
Uzbekistan’s participation is particularly illustrative of this broader shift. Long constrained by its double-landlocked geography, Tashkent has increasingly pursued a deliberate strategy of repositioning itself as a transit hub rather than a terminal economy at the end of regional supply chains. Integration into a westward route reaching the Caspian Sea and onward markets directly supports this objective by expanding transit optionality and reducing structural dependence on a limited set of inherited corridors. This reorientation is further reinforced by the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, now under construction after decades of delay, which will establish an additional east–west rail axis that bypasses Kazakhstan. While neither development alone is transformative, together they incrementally recalibrate Central Asia’s connectivity logic by weakening reliance on single-axis transit routes and enhancing Uzbekistan’s strategic flexibility within evolving Eurasian transport networks.
The timing of these changes is closely connected to broader shifts in the geopolitical and commercial environment. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Northern Corridor, long a key overland route linking China and Europe, has become subject to heightened political sensitivity and closer scrutiny by segments of the logistics and shipping industry. Even in cases where sanctions do not formally apply, regulatory uncertainty, insurance constraints, and reputational considerations have increasingly factored into corporate risk assessments and routing decisions. Within this context, the Middle Corridor’s appeal lies less in relative speed or cost efficiency than in its capacity to provide diversification. By offering an additional transit option, it introduces redundancy into Eurasian supply chains and helps mitigate vulnerabilities associated with heavy reliance on a single transit geography.
Within this evolving connectivity architecture, the Caspian Sea has acquired renewed significance as a strategic connective hinge linking Central Asia to wider Eurasian transport networks. Turkmenistan has become a more visible transit actor following sustained investments in the Port of Turkmenbashi, which now serves as a key interface between Central Asian rail systems and trans-Caspian maritime routes. For Ashgabat, this role extends beyond transit revenues. It supports broader efforts to diversify economic activity away from hydrocarbons by expanding logistics services, port-related industries, and trade facilitation capacities. At the same time, deeper integration into Caspian transport chains enhances Turkmenistan’s connectivity with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Türkiye, embedding the country more firmly within an emerging trans-Caspian transit ecosystem.
On the western shore of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan has positioned itself as a coordinating node rather than a passive transit state. The Port of Baku functions as a redistribution hub where east–west and north–south transport corridors intersect. Cargo arriving from Central Asia can move westward via the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway toward Türkiye and European markets, southward through the International North–South Transport Corridor toward Iran and the Persian Gulf, or potentially through the TRIPP/Zangezur route linking mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan and onward to Anatolia. Long-term investments in port capacity, rail infrastructure, and associated free economic zones were undertaken precisely to enable this integrative role, allowing Azerbaijan to translate growing east–west traffic flows into durable strategic centrality within Eurasian connectivity networks.
Azerbaijan’s recent inclusion in the C5 format of Central Asian co-operation further reinforces this role and carries significance for the Middle Corridor’s political economy. By joining a framework that brings together the Central Asian states and an external strategic partner, Azerbaijan has effectively extended the format westward across the Caspian Sea, linking Central Asia’s internal connectivity agenda with South Caucasus transit infrastructure. This development reflects growing recognition that sustainable connectivity cannot stop at the Caspian shoreline. Instead, it must be anchored in reliable onward routes through the South Caucasus toward European and Mediterranean markets. Azerbaijan’s participation in the C5 format thus signals a shift from a purely Central Asian coordination mechanism toward a trans-regional connectivity platform in which transport, logistics, and regulatory alignment across the Caspian basin gain greater prominence.
At the same time, physical infrastructure alone will not determine the corridor’s long-term trajectory. The Middle Corridor’s next phase is likely to be shaped increasingly by governance and coordination rather than additional construction. Tariff alignment, customs harmonization, scheduling coordination, and the deployment of digital transit solutions remain uneven across participating states, including along the Central Asia-South Caucasus interface. In the absence of progress on these institutional dimensions, gains in physical connectivity risk being diluted by administrative friction and procedural delays. Recent initiatives within the Turkic geopolitical space, including multilateral agreements and coordination efforts facilitated through frameworks such as the Organization of Turkic States, indicate growing recognition of these constraints and point toward a gradual move toward more institutionalized corridor management.
Ultimately, the combination of new multimodal routes, advancing rail links, port modernization, and shifting geopolitical risk calculations has begun to translate long-discussed connectivity concepts into more operational realities. While the scale of current traffic remains limited, the structural significance lies in the diversification of routes, the redistribution of transit dependencies, and the emergence of a multidirectional connectivity logic centered on the Central Asia South Caucasus axis. By anchoring Central Asian trade flows in a stable South Caucasus transit space and reinforcing Azerbaijan’s role as a bridge between regional coordination formats and continental markets, the Middle Corridor enhances strategic optionality for regional states and reduces exposure to single-axis vulnerabilities. If governance and coordination challenges are addressed, the Middle Corridor is likely to evolve from an alternative pathway into a stable component of Eurasia’s connectivity architecture, reinforcing Central Asia’s shift from landlocked periphery to land-linked intermediary in an increasingly fragmented global economy.
